

No. 23-2110

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

JOSEPH CAMMARATA,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

This case presents the question whether a federal criminal conviction may stand where the conduct charged is the specific conduct this Court has held lawful, where the trial was presided over by a judge subject to at least five independent statutory grounds for disqualification, and where the appellate review that followed was conducted by a court structurally disabled from impartiality. The specific questions are:

1. Whether a federal wire-fraud conviction comports with due process, or instead punishes conduct that is no “offense against the laws of the United States,” 18 U.S.C. § 3231, where the charged conduct is the submission of securities class-action settlement claims through valid legal assignments, the precise conduct this Court held lawful in *Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc.*, 554 U.S. 269 (2008); where the prosecution never cited *Sprint*, the Government’s own post-trial brief conceded the underlying trades may have been entirely real and that fake trades were never charged, the lead trial prosecutor recognized the assignment on the record and moved to strike his own recognition, and the trial court conceded that *Sprint* states the governing rule and that the indictment did not preclude the assignment defense; and where, in four and a half years, neither the district court nor the court of appeals has ever adjudicated the charged conduct against *Sprint*.
2. Whether the Government constructively amended the indictment in violation of the Grand Jury Clause where, after the petitioner testified and established that his conduct was lawful assignment exactly as described in *Sprint*, the Government abandoned the theory charged in Paragraph 11 and substituted in closing an uncharged theory that the petitioner “stole” the trades, a theory never presented to the grand jury and affirmatively disproven by the Government’s own witnesses, who confirmed that not a single duplicate claim was ever filed. See *Stirone v. United States*, 361 U.S. 212 (1960); *United States v. Syme*, 276 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2002).
3. Whether the district court’s failure to enter the order mandated by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(f) and the Due Process Protections Act of 2020 is structural error where that failure permitted the Government to suppress *Sprint* as controlling, exculpatory legal authority, the very authority that invalidated Paragraph 11 of the indictment and the Government’s entire case in chief. See *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); *Strickler v. Greene*, 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
4. Whether the trial judge and the judges of the court of appeals were statutorily disqualified, requiring vacatur under *Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.*, 486 U.S. 847 (1988), where they were subject to at least five separate and uncontested grounds for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 as to the trial judge, including a § 455(b)(4) financial interest he admitted on the record from the bench,

together with the structural disqualification of the court of appeals, and where none disqualified himself.

5. Whether a litigant is denied the impartial appellate review guaranteed by the Due Process Clause where every panel of the court of appeals to consider his four related cases was operationally supported by the spouse of the very prosecutor he had accused of misconduct, and where that court disposed of his claims through unexplained one-word denials, a 361-day silence culminating in a denial that addressed none of his allegations, a related appeal left pending more than two years without any responsive brief, and an opinion that misstated the trial record.
6. Whether, under *United States v. Olano*, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), the cumulative effect of a conviction for lawful conduct, a financially interested trial judge, a conflicted lead prosecutor, suppressed exculpatory authority, a judicially manufactured victim theory the appellate panel itself rejected, and the retaliatory obstruction of the petitioner's access to this Court "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings" such that vacatur is required regardless of preservation.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND RELATED CASES

The petitioner is Joseph Cammarata, the defendant-appellant below. The respondent is the United States of America. There are no corporate parties.

The following proceedings are directly related to this petition within the meaning of Rule 14.1(b)(iii):

- *United States v. Cammarata*, No. 21-cr-427 (E.D. Pa.) (judgment of conviction; amended § 2255 motion pending, Civ. No. 26-379).
- *United States v. Cammarata*, 129 F.4th 193 (3d Cir. 2025) (the judgment below).
- *SEC v. Cammarata*, No. 21-cv-4845 (E.D. Pa.) (parallel civil enforcement action before the same district judge); interlocutory appeal pending, No. 24-1381 (3d Cir.).
- *In re Cammarata*, No. 25-1188 (3d Cir.) (mandamus); *Cammarata v. United States*, No. 25-6128 (U.S.) (mandamus denied Jan. 20, 2026; rehearing denied without opinion or stated reason).
- *United States v. Cammarata*, No. 24-1983 (3d Cir.) (related tax appeal); *Cammarata v. Donnelly*, No. 24-cv-1000 (D.N.J.).

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Joseph Cammarata respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

The precedential opinion of the court of appeals affirming the conviction is reported at *United States v. Cammarata*, 129 F.4th 193 (3d Cir. 2025). The order denying rehearing and rehearing en banc is unreported. The judgment and sentence of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Kenney, J.) are unreported.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on February 24, 2025, and denied a timely petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The judgment of the court of appeals, together with the Clerk's correspondence of April 9, 2026 setting the time for completing this filing, brings the petition within the period prescribed by this Court's Rule 13. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the Fifth Amendment (Grand Jury and Due Process Clauses) and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 18 U.S.C. § 3231; 28 U.S.C. § 455; Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(f); and the Due Process Protections Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-182, 134 Stat. 894. The relevant texts are reproduced in the appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The conduct charged: assignment of real, owned trades.

Petitioner founded SpeedRoute, a trading-technology firm that at its peak executed approximately three percent of daily United States equity-exchange volume, on the order of eleven million trades per day. Trial Tr., Day 5 (Oct. 25, 2022), at 57:22–58:4. Petitioner owned the underlying trade data. He assigned that data to three entities, Quartis, Nimello, and Invergasa, which then submitted securities class-action settlement claims as the beneficial owners of the assigned claims. Petitioner testified that this was a recognized practice and invoked this Court's decision in *Sprint* by name:

There's a concept called assignment Specifically [as] to that business, there was a big case, Sprint Communications. Specifically the

Supreme Court talked about assignment for a securities class action being perfectly acceptable

Trial Tr., Day 5, at 53:1–54:6. The testimony was not contested on cross-examination. The assignment model had been vetted in 2009 by Richard Schifffrin, the petitioner’s business partner, who not only invested in class-action claim businesses with the petitioner but had served as lead counsel in numerous securities class actions resolving billions of dollars in settlements, and who concluded the model was lawful. *Id.* at 30:22–31:7.

B. The Government’s witnesses confirmed the predicates for assignment, and never determined the trades were not real.

The Government’s own claims-administrator witnesses confirmed both that claims may be filed by one party on behalf of a beneficial owner with proof of authority, and that they never determined the underlying trades were not real. James Facciolla testified: “WE NEVER DETERMINED . . . WHETHER IT WAS RIGHT OR WRONG,” and confirmed “YOU NEVER DETERMINED THAT THE TRADES WERE FAKE”, “CORRECT.” Trial Tr., Day 1 (Oct. 19, 2022), at 183. Dan Dearden and Tina Chiango gave the same concession. *Id.*, Day 2, at 186–87; Day 4, at 184. Stephen Dickson confirmed that Quartis acquired trade data from defunct broker-dealers and “could then process it for claims.” *Id.*, Day 1, at 216:19–217:2. The Government’s cooperating witness Erik Cohen testified that “[i]t’s not atypical to sell your claims from one company to another in our business.” *Id.*, Day 2, at 230:7–10.

C. The Government conceded in writing that the trades may have been real.

In its post-trial opposition, the Government wrote:

even if Cammarata were right, and even if each and every one of the underlying stock trades were real, there was no divergence between the indictment and the evidence.

Gov’t Opp. to Post-Trial Mots., ECF No. 267, at 22 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2023). The same brief identified petitioner’s five-part assignment defense, addressed it on the merits, and rejected it, without citing *Sprint*, 554 U.S. 269, *APCC*, or the volume at 554 U.S. anywhere in its thirty-five pages. ECF No. 267, at 26.

The same brief went further, conceding that fake trades were never the charge at all: “Nowhere did the indictment allege that the underlying stock trades did not occur. Indeed, fake stock trades was not even one of the examples specified in the charging instrument.” ECF No. 267, at 20–21. The Government thus told the district court, in writing, both that

the trades may have been entirely real and that their falsity was never an element it charged. A theory the Government concedes it never charged cannot sustain the conviction the Government obtained.

D. The lead prosecutor recognized the assignment on the record, then struck his own question.

While examining cooperator David Punturieri, the lead trial prosecutor, Assistant United States Attorney Paul G. Shapiro, was asking the cooperating witness David Punturieri why he believed it was permissible to file claims in the name of an entity that had not itself executed the trades; when Punturieri answered that the petitioner “told him that Quartis bought the trades,” Shapiro recognized the assignment framework in the exhibit before him and said so aloud, then immediately moved to strike his own half-question before the witness or jury could engage it:

THIS APPEARS TO BE ASSIGNED — ACTUALLY, I’M GOING TO STRIKE THAT HALF A QUESTION. SAME THING, CAN WE JUST CALL IT QUARTIS AND —

Trial Tr., Day 4 (Oct. 24, 2022), at 20:11–13. The prosecutor recognized that the conduct “appear[ed] to be assigned”, the precise conduct *Sprint* authorizes, and acted to remove the recognition from the record.

E. The Government abandoned the charged theory and conceded the right to assign.

In rebuttal closing, the Government conceded the legality of assignment and recast the case to avoid it: “This case is not about whether Mr. Cammarata had some abstract right to assign something he owned to somebody else. This case is exactly as it looks like. This is about a scheme to defraud.” Trial Tr., Day 6 (Oct. 26, 2022), at 103:23–104:1. The indictment’s Paragraph 11 had charged that claimants “were required” to have personally traded and personally lost. After petitioner invoked *Sprint*, the Government abandoned that theory and substituted uncharged theories, first that the trades were “stolen,” then that the assignees failed to disclose their assignee status. Neither was presented to the grand jury.

The “stolen trades” theory was not only uncharged; it was affirmatively disproven on the record. The Government’s own claims-administrator witnesses confirmed that not a single duplicate claim was ever identified, meaning no genuine owner was ever displaced by petitioner’s claims. Theft of a trade requires that the true owner have filed, or been able to file, the same claim; where no duplicate claim exists anywhere in the settlement systems, it is mathematically impossible that petitioner’s claims were stolen from anyone. The point is independent of *Sprint*: the newly fabricated “stolen trades” theory was not only

uncharged, it was mathematically impossible. Across roughly ten million claims filed over seven years, not one duplicate claim ever appeared; had any trade belonged to another owner or been “stolen,” duplicate filings would have appeared by the millions. The substitution of a theory both uncharged and disproven by the Government’s own records was an act of bad-faith prosecutorial misconduct.

F. The district court conceded that Sprint governs and that the indictment did not preclude the defense.

In its April 13, 2026 memorandum denying reconsideration, the district court made two dispositive concessions. On the law: “no one is disputing that the Supreme Court case, *Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc.*, provides that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.” ECF No. 487, at 3 (quoting 554 U.S. at 286). On the indictment: “Nothing in Paragraph 11, or indeed, in the entire Superseding Indictment, precludes Defendant from taking the position that the claimants represented by Alpha Plus were assignees of valid claims, and as such, the claims filed by Alpha Plus were not fraudulent.” ECF No. 487, at 4. The legal premise and the indictment’s reach are thus both conceded.

G. The trial judge’s admitted financial interest, and the manufactured victims.

At sentencing, the trial judge stated, in the first person, while imposing sentence:

I, I, I have invested, I’ve made a claim and they say, this is how much you’re getting back based on all the claims that were made. Forty million dollars is removed and you’re not getting it. Now, when forty million dollars comes back, you’re going to get the portion that you lost.

Sentencing Tr., ECF No. 310, at 69:12–18 (June 6, 2023). The transcript preserves the judge stammering, “I, I, I have invested”, a departure from the composure of a disinterested jurist that is itself probative: a judge with no personal stake in the securities-claims process would have had no cause to speak in the first person, or with such evident agitation, about his own investing and claim-making while imposing sentence. The judge’s financial-disclosure reports (Forms AO-10) reflect that he purchased Apple, Boeing, and Exxon Mobil on December 24, 2018 and February 14, 2019, each within the class period of a pending securities class action concerning that issuer (Ex. A, at 4–5; Ex. B, at 4–5; Ex. C, at 4), and that the Apple action settled on September 18, 2024, while petitioner’s appeal was pending and he remained class-eligible. The judge then supplied the victim theory the Government had not: where the Government identified no individual victim, the court declared the settlement administrators “the victims,” *id.* at 69:18–24, and applied a ten-or-

more-victims enhancement on that basis. The author of the precedential affirmance, Judge D. Brooks Smith, rejected that theory at oral argument: “Would you agree with me that the district court was wrong in saying that the claims administrators were victims?”, “Yes. Yes. Yes.” 23-2110 Oral Arg. Tr. (Sept. 19, 2024); and to the Government: “He also called the administrators victims which can’t be correct.”

H. The panel opinion and the appellate pattern.

The panel opinion affirmed in a single controlling paragraph that, as petitioner’s rehearing addendum demonstrated sentence by sentence, rests on six discrete errors, most centrally the assertion that “no evidence was presented to show that Nimello, Quartis, and Invergasa were ever the beneficial owners.” 23-2110, ECF No. 59, at 19. That statement was not merely unsupported; it was affirmatively false and provably so. Every claim form the petitioner ever filed disclosed and attested, under penalty of perjury, that the named entity was the beneficial owner and eligible claimant. Those attestations were in evidence on the face of the claim exhibits (e.g., Gov’t Ex. 152), and petitioner placed the documentary proof before the court in his petition for rehearing at ECF No. 69, which the court refused to acknowledge. A court of appeals that affirms a criminal conviction by declaring the central fact of the case the opposite of what the record’s own exhibits attest, and then declines even to look at the documents proving the error, has not conducted review. The opinion does not mention *Sprint* once. The same court, in the petitioner’s three other related matters, has allowed the parallel SEC appeal (No. 24-1381) to sit for more than two years, through today, without a merits brief from the Commission, after the Commission missed every filing deadline and its last extension request on September 12, 2025; denied mandamus (No. 25-1188) after 361 days without addressing a single allegation; and denied rehearing in the tax appeal (No. 24-1983) over unaddressed Brady and other documented claims. Part VI *infra* explains why this pattern is not coincidence.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Each of the six questions presented independently warrants review, and each, if answered in petitioner's favor, requires vacatur. Taken together, they describe a criminal conviction that fails at every level on which the system is supposed to test it: the conduct was lawful, the indictment was abandoned, the favorable authority was suppressed, the trial judge was disqualified, the appellate court was compromised, and the petitioner's access to this Court was obstructed. The Court need not accept all six to grant relief. It need accept only one. And underlying them all is a fact this Court rarely encounters: the petitioner is actually innocent, because the conduct proved at trial is the precise conduct this Court has held lawful.

I. This Is the Exceptional Case of Actual Innocence, Where Refusing Review Would Extend a Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice.

This Court has reserved its most searching attention for the rare case in which a person stands convicted of conduct that is not criminal, because "the execution of a legally and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event." *Herrera v. Collins*, 506 U.S. 390, 419 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring). A credible showing of actual innocence permits a court to reach the merits notwithstanding any procedural obstacle, because in such a case the miscarriage of justice from inaction outweighs the interest in finality. *Schlup v. Delo*, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995); *McQuiggin v. Perkins*, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013); *House v. Bell*, 547 U.S. 518 (2006). That principle answers every preservation and default argument the Government has advanced in this case.

The innocence here is not a matter of reweighing disputed evidence; it is established by this Court's own precedent applied to undisputed facts. The indictment's Paragraph 11, the sole theory of criminality, alleged that the settlement claimants were required to have personally executed the trades and personally suffered the losses. Every claims-administrator witness the Government called testified that this was false: claims may be filed by an assignee or authorized party on proof of ownership, and none of them ever verified, or needed to verify, that the trades belonged to the claimant personally. *Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc.*, 554 U.S. 269 (2008), holds precisely that an assignee may pursue an assigned claim. The conduct the Government prosecuted as fraud is therefore the conduct this Court has declared lawful. On this record, "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted," *Schlup*, 513 U.S. at 327, because the only theory of guilt was legally foreclosed and factually disproven by the Government's own proof.

The Government has never contested this. It conceded in writing that the trades may have been entirely real and that fake trades were never charged; its lead prosecutor recognized the assignment on the record; and the district court conceded that *Sprint* governs and that the indictment did not preclude the defense. An innocence this complete, conceded at every turn yet never once adjudicated in four and a half years, is the fundamental miscarriage of justice the writ exists to correct. The remaining questions establish how that miscarriage was produced and why it has never been remedied.

II. The Conviction Rests on Conduct This Court Held Lawful in *Sprint*, and No Court Has Ever Adjudicated It.

In *Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc.*, 554 U.S. 269 (2008), a unanimous Court held that an assignee of a legal claim may assert that claim, including the injury suffered by the assignor, and that a valid assignment transfers the right to recover even where the assignee suffered no underlying injury of its own. *Id.* at 285–86. The Court further made clear that the assignee pursues the claim as the real party in interest, in its own name and as the first party rather than as a third party. *Id.* at 271, 286. Securities class-action settlement rights are freely assignable. The conduct for which petitioner stands convicted, assigning real, beneficially owned trade data to entities that then filed settlement claims as the new beneficial owners, is the conduct *Sprint* authorizes. Lawful conduct is not a federal crime, and an indictment that charges only lawful conduct charges no “offense[] against the laws of the United States,” 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

What makes this case extraordinary is not that the argument exists, but that every actor in the proceeding has conceded its premises while no court has ever ruled on it. The Government conceded in writing that the trades may have been entirely real. ECF No. 267, at 22. Its lead prosecutor recognized the assignment on the record and struck his own question. Trial Tr., Day 4, at 20:11–13. Its rebuttal closing conceded petitioner’s “right to assign something he owned.” Trial Tr., Day 6, at 103:23–104:1. And the district court conceded both that *Sprint* states the governing rule and that the Superseding Indictment “did not preclude” the assignment defense. ECF No. 487, at 3–4. Yet the panel opinion affirming the conviction does not contain the word *Sprint*. 129 F.4th 193.

This is the rare case in which the controlling authority is not disputed, only ignored. For four and a half years, across a trial, a direct appeal, en banc proceedings, and collateral review, no court has adjudicated whether the charged conduct is a crime once *Sprint* is applied. A federal conviction that no court can square with this Court’s unanimous

precedent, and that the prosecuting sovereign and the trial judge have conceded turns on lawful conduct, cannot be allowed to stand without this Court's review.

III. The Government Constructively Amended the Indictment by Abandoning the Charged Theory Mid-Trial.

The Fifth Amendment guarantees that a defendant will be tried only on charges a grand jury returned. *Stirone v. United States*, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960). A constructive amendment, where the proof and instructions permit conviction on a theory not charged, is reversible error. *United States v. Syme*, 276 F.3d 131, 148 (3d Cir. 2002). Paragraph 11 of the Superseding Indictment charged a single theory: that claimants “were required” to have personally executed the trades and personally suffered the losses. When petitioner met that theory with *Sprint*, the Government abandoned it. In rebuttal it disclaimed any quarrel with petitioner’s “right to assign,” and recast the case as a generalized “scheme to defraud.” Trial Tr., Day 6, at 103:23–104:1. Post-trial, it advanced yet another uncharged theory, that petitioner “fail[ed] to identify” the assignees. ECF No. 267, at 26.

A prosecution that charges one theory to the grand jury and convicts on another, switching theories precisely to evade controlling law, violates the Grand Jury Clause at its core. Contrary to the panel’s characterization, the claim was preserved: the petitioner raised the constructive-amendment and *Sprint*-based challenge in his post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal and a new trial under Rules 29 and 33 (21-cr-427, ECF No. 264) and again in his pro se reply (ECF No. 274). The courts below nonetheless never reached whether the successive theory-substitutions were themselves a constructive amendment foreclosed by *Stirone*.

IV. The Suppression of Exculpatory Authority and Evidence, Compounded by the Absence of the Mandatory Rule 5(f) Order, Violated Due Process.

The duty to disclose favorable material extends to exculpatory and impeachment material alike. *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); *Strickler v. Greene*, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). Two failures converge here.

A. Suppressed exculpatory and impeachment material.

The Government’s first witness, James Facciolla, supplied the probable-cause foundation on direct, testifying that the clearing firms on the list “did not make sense” and were invalid, then conceded on cross that the list was in fact a list of clients, that he called only two, and that both confirmed they were clients. Trial Tr., Day 1, at 152–53, 179–81.

The same witness admitted he intended to seek SEC whistleblower rewards contingent on the success of this prosecution and the parallel SEC action, classic *Giglio* impeachment. *Id.* at 191–92; *Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Separately, the FBI left all three of petitioner’s computers in the unsupervised custody of the cooperating witness Erik Cohen for two weeks; Cohen self-collected the entire Alpha Plus email system as administrator, with no chain of custody, and did not produce it until mid-trial; and on the day his arrest warrant was executed he wrote, “I don’t think they realized that we bought the data. We will figure it out.” *Id.*, Day 5, at 245–53. The integrity of that evidence, and the timing and scope of Cohen’s pre-indictment cooperation, was never disclosed in a form the defense could use.

B. The suppression of controlling exculpatory authority.

The Government could not have conceded petitioner’s “right to assign something he owned” without knowing the authority that establishes it. *Strickler* confirms that the disclosure duty reaches favorable authority the prosecution possesses and the defense is denied. The lead prosecutor’s recognition-and-strike, Trial Tr., Day 4, at 20:11–13, is itself evidence that the Government recognized the dispositive framework and acted to bury it.

C. The mandatory Rule 5(f) order was never entered.

The Due Process Protections Act of 2020 amended Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(f) to require the court, at the initial appearance, to issue an oral and written order confirming the prosecutor’s *Brady* obligations and the consequences of violating them. No such written order was entered in this case, as the docket itself demonstrates. The violation was not technical; it was prejudicial, because it removed the very framework Congress enacted to prevent the suppression that occurred here. The Government has argued that *Brady* reaches evidence but not the published *Sprint* opinion, but that misunderstands the doctrine: “favorable” material under *Strickler v. Greene*, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999), includes authority the prosecution knows undermines the legal theory of culpability it is advancing, and here the prosecution’s lead counsel had recognized the dispositive authority on the record and moved to strike his own recognition before the witness could engage it. A Rule 5(f) order exists precisely to compel disclosure of such controlling, exculpatory authority; its total absence is structural error and compounds the *Brady* violation. *United States v. Olano*, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).

V. The Trial Judge Was Subject to at Least Six Independent Disqualifying Grounds, One Admitted on the Record.

Section 455 is mandatory and self-executing. At least six independent grounds required the trial judge's disqualification; the remedy for their violation is vacatur. *Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.*, 486 U.S. 847, 862–64 (1988).

(1) § 455(b)(4), financial interest. The judge admitted from the bench, while imposing sentence, “I, I, I have invested, I’ve made a claim . . . you’re going to get the portion that you lost.” ECF No. 310, at 69:12–18. That admission is corroborated by his financial-disclosure reports. The judge purchased Apple Inc. on December 24, 2018 (Form AO-10, Ex. A, at 4, line 7), within the class period of *In re Apple Inc. Securities Litigation*, No. 4:19-cv-02033 (Nov. 2, 2018 – Jan. 2, 2019), and continued to hold it at value code K (\$15,001–\$50,000) through 2020 (Ex. C, at 4, line 11); that action settled on September 18, 2024, while petitioner’s direct appeal was pending and he remained a class-eligible holder. He purchased Boeing Co. on December 24, 2018 and February 14, 2019 (Ex. A, at 4, line 11; Ex. B, at 4, line 17), within the class period of *In re The Boeing Co. Aircraft Securities Litigation* (Nov. 7, 2018 – Oct. 18, 2019). And he purchased Exxon Mobil Corp. on December 24, 2018 and February 14, 2019 (Ex. A, at 5, line 20; Ex. B, at 5, line 32), within the class period of *Yoshikawa v. Exxon Mobil Corp.*, No. 3:21-cv-00194-N (N.D. Tex.) (Mar. 7, 2018 – Jan. 15, 2021). The judge was thus a class-period purchaser of the very securities at issue in pending class actions throughout the relevant period. The district court’s response, that the charged conduct predated the establishment of those particular settlement funds (ECF No. 487, at 3), misframes the inquiry. Section 455(b)(4) asks whether the judge holds “a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy,” not whether he belonged to the specific funds named in the prosecution. The subject matter here is securities-class-action claim eligibility and recovery, the very activity the judge admitted engaging in from the bench. Section 455(d)(4) defines the disqualifying interest to include ownership “however small,” foreclosing any argument that the stake was *de minimis*. Petitioner further represents that he was himself a class member in nearly every major securities-class-action settlement from 2008 through 2020, the same activity the judge described from the bench, which underscores that the judge’s own “I have invested, I’ve made a claim” statement placed him within the very class of claimants whose recoveries were the subject matter of the prosecution. The available AO-10 disclosures span only 2018 through 2020, and the Pennsylvania state court has to date refused to produce Judge Kenney’s financial disclosures from his 2008–2018 tenure. Those earlier disclosures would, on the judge’s own sworn account of having invested and

made claims, almost certainly confirm holdings and class memberships extending well beyond the three individual stocks reflected in the 2018–2020 reports, which by themselves already require disqualification.

(2) § 455(b)(1), personal bias. Nine months before trial, at a January 11, 2022 status conference in the parallel civil action that petitioner had no notice of and did not attend, the judge stated from the bench that he had “a lot of other people in this courtroom, believe me, who have been making money by illegal means. They’re arrested. They have federal defenders, not — not people like Mr. Pozos representing them, and their families are starving, believe me.” ECF No. 71, at 27 (21-cv-4845). In a single sentence the judge placed petitioner among those “who have been making money by illegal means,” before any evidence had been heard, and expressed resentment that petitioner had retained counsel rather than the “federal defenders” he associated with the guilty. Told moments earlier that petitioner’s wife, a non-party, was not working, the judge responded, “Res ipsa,” *id.*, the thing speaks for itself, and added that she “unfortunately, may have to get a job for now,” *id.* at 27–28, and that “given the nature of the allegation, that \$40 million, you know, Ms. Cammarata may be sitting on zero or minus zero,” *id.* at 29. Earlier in the same proceeding he observed that he did not “see anybody starving here from some of these checks that are going out.” *id.* at 10–11. These are not rulings; they are expressions of a settled belief in guilt and of personal grievance about the resources of a presumptively innocent defendant and his family, formed outside the evidence and voiced in petitioner’s absence. Confronted at sentencing with his statement that he considered the case “a crime against the Courts” and his remark that petitioner’s wife had “enjoyed the fruits of this criminal enterprise for many years,” the judge did not deny making either statement, responding only that “this Court was not biased.” ECF No. 310, at 76:7–14. The Court of Appeals in No. 25-1188 acknowledged petitioner’s allegations that the trial judge “deleted portions of the transcript” and held “simultaneous hearings in both matters,” yet never reached the merits of either allegation.

(3) § 455(b)(5)(i), the judge is a named party. Since January 2024 the judge has been a named defendant in *Cammarata v. Donnelly*, No. 24-cv-1000 (D.N.J.), a civil action arising from the same conduct and taken in the absence of all jurisdiction, rendering every subsequent order voidable.

(4) § 455(b)(5)(iii), personal knowledge of disputed facts. The “crime against the Courts” determination was reached at the parallel civil temporary-restraining-order hearing before any evidence had been taken, reflecting extrajudicial knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts. The circumstances of that proceeding compound the

appearance and the fact of prejudgment. The same judge entered an ex parte TRO (ECF No. 4 in 21-cv-4845, Nov. 4, 2021) on a motion exceeding 900 pages in less than twenty-four hours, and that order contains no finding of irreparable harm anywhere in its eighteen pages, as Rule 65(b)(1)(A) requires. The ex parte TRO was initially issued on November 4, 2021 for a fourteen-day period, without any required showing or mention of irreparable harm. The judge set the show-cause hearing for 9:00 a.m. on November 9, 2021 in Philadelphia, the precise date and time petitioner was compelled to appear at his criminal bail hearing 1,200 miles away in the Southern District of Florida. These were simultaneous hearings before the same judge, in both matters, on November 9, 2021 at 9:00 a.m. The TRO hearing proceeded without any notice to petitioner and in his absence, a fact the court itself memorialized: “No one appeared on behalf of Defendants Joseph A. Cammarata.” ECF No. 17 (Nov. 10, 2021), at 1. The TRO was then unlawfully extended, without any hearing and without petitioner’s consent, to December 14, 2021, exceeding the fourteen-day limit that Rule 65(b)(2) permits only on a showing of good cause or consent, neither of which was present. The ex parte order, which froze more than \$78 million of petitioner’s assets against alleged proceeds of roughly \$16 million, without any finding of irreparable harm, without subject-matter jurisdiction, and without due process, had thus expired as a matter of law at 11:59 p.m. on November 24, 2021 by operation of Rule 65(b)(2). A judge who presided over both tracks of this dual proceeding, and who prejudged the merits at an ex parte hearing the defendant could not attend, was disqualified. Cf. *SEC v. Antar*, 71 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 1995).

- (5) § 455, the new indictment and pending contempt trial before the same judge.** A sixth and independently disqualifying circumstance has now arisen. On May 28, 2026, the same Assistant United States Attorneys, David Ignall and Paul Shapiro, obtained a new indictment against petitioner, No. 26-cr-238-CFK (E.D. Pa.), again assigned to Judge Kenney. Its lead count charges petitioner with criminal contempt, 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), for allegedly disobeying the very November 4, 2021 asset-freeze order that Judge Kenney himself issued, that was granted without any finding of irreparable harm, that was unlawfully extended without due process, that expired by operation of law on November 24, 2021, and that remains under appeal in No. 24-1381, where the Commission has filed no responsive brief for more than two years despite its last deadline in September 2025. Judge Kenney cannot preside over a prosecution for contempt of his own order, brought by the same prosecutors petitioner has sued, while his authority to have entered that order is itself the

question on appeal. That is naked self-dealing, and it independently disqualifies him under 28 U.S.C. § 455.

(6) § 455(a), appearance of partiality. The judge manufactured a victim theory the Government never advanced and that the panel author rejected at oral argument, and bypassed petitioner's readily available domestic funds to liquidate a foreign-trust asset he did not own, an asset that is itself the subject of the pending action in *Cammarata v. United States*, No. 24-cv-1000 (D.N.J.). *Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.*, 557 U.S. 868 (2009). The same partiality is reflected in the parallel civil action, where the judge granted the Commission summary judgment on a motion the record and docket prove petitioner never received, and did so on the legally untenable ground that a securities-fraud judgment was collaterally estopped by the criminal wire-fraud conviction. Collateral estoppel requires that the identical issue have been actually litigated and necessarily decided. *Allen v. McCurry*, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Wire fraud and securities fraud are not the same issue; and the judge had expressly declined to decide the securities-fraud question in the criminal case, stating it was better litigated in the civil action (ECF No. 310, at 56–57), which forecloses estoppel as a matter of law.

Any one of these grounds required disqualification. Their convergence in a single judge, who then imposed a 120-month sentence on conduct he conceded involved “real trades”, is the kind of grave § 455 violation for which *Liljeberg* prescribes vacatur.

VI. Petitioner Was Denied Impartial Appellate Review by a Structurally Compromised Court.

The Due Process Clause guarantees not only an impartial trial judge but impartial review. Every panel of the Third Circuit to consider petitioner's four related cases was operationally supported by the Executive Office of that court, where Jeanne Donnelly, the spouse of John V. Donnelly III, the SEC prosecutor petitioner had formally accused of misconduct, serves as an attorney within the office that provides administrative and legal support to the judges of that court. That relationship was never disclosed to petitioner by the court at any point in any of his four appeals. To any reasonable observer, a court whose own executive office employs the spouse of the prosecutor, who is himself charged with misconduct, cannot sit in impartial judgment of that misconduct; that is the precise circumstance 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) exists to prevent. The conflict was raised on the record many times, through petitioner's motions to recuse, to transfer to an unconflicted venue, for reconsideration, and to disqualify the entire Circuit, in Nos. 24-1381 and 25-1188, and has

gone undisclosed, uncontested, and unaddressed for two years, which is the most plausible explanation for why the issues are met with silence rather than any response.

The conflict is not theoretical; it is corroborated by the disposition pattern. The parallel SEC appeal, No. 24-1381, has sat for more than two years with no merits brief from the Commission and no action by the court. The mandamus petition, No. 25-1188, was wholly unopposed, the Government never responded to it at all, yet the court still allowed it to sit for 361 days before denying it in an order that acknowledged petitioner's allegations, including transcript deletion, simultaneous hearings, and ex parte communication, and then addressed none of them; the court also denied petitioner's request to transfer the matter to a non-conflicted court, without explanation, and the judges denied recusal on en banc review without stating reasons. The tax appeal, No. 24-1983, was affirmed over unaddressed *Brady* claims and numerous other serious, documented violations that were never addressed at all. And in this case, the panel opinion affirmed on a single paragraph that misstated the trial record and never mentioned *Sprint*. A series of unexplained one-word denials is the signature of a court that has stopped engaging.

The Government's conduct confirms the pattern from the other direction. The well-documented allegations of conflict and disqualification at the center of this petition have gone unanswered by the Government in every forum in which petitioner has raised them: the mandamus proceeding in No. 25-1188 was unopposed; the interlocutory appeal in No. 24-1381 has drawn no merits brief from the Commission in more than two years; and in this Court, the Solicitor General did not respond to the petition in No. 25-6128. A litigant's adversary does not ordinarily decline, across four proceedings and two levels of the federal judiciary, to contest serious, specific, and documented allegations of judicial and prosecutorial conflict, unless those allegations cannot safely be contested. The silence is itself evidence.

That conclusion is sharpened by the Third Circuit's treatment of its own precedent. In *SEC v. Antar*, 71 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 1995), and *United States v. Antar*, 53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1995), that court disqualified a district judge who presided over parallel SEC civil and criminal proceedings and revealed an objective of returning restitution to the victims. Here that objective is far more damning: no crime occurred, the judge declared his own financial interest from the bench, and the only person ever to identify any "victim" was the judge himself, who named settlement administrators the appellate panel then confirmed were not victims at all. Restitution may not be imposed absent an identifiable victim, yet the judge ordered it, and stands to collect on it as an eligible claimant. Petitioner's record, the same dual-track posture before the same judge, foundational hearings held the same day 1,200

miles apart with no notice or due process, an admitted financial interest, and a victim theory the judge alone manufactured and that was proven false, is materially and profoundly more egregious than *Antar*. The Third Circuit declined to apply its own binding law. A court that will not follow its own controlling precedent when the conflict implicates the court itself is not providing the impartial review the Constitution requires.

VII. The Cumulative Structural Error Requires Vacatur Under *Olano* Regardless of Preservation.

Even if any single error could be falsely characterized as unpreserved, this Court has long recognized that errors which “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings” require correction regardless of preservation. *United States v. Olano*, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993). This record presents that case in its most acute form: a conviction for conduct this Court held lawful; a trial judge with an admitted financial interest and at least five further disqualifying grounds; a lead prosecutor who recognized and buried the dispositive authority; a victim theory manufactured by the court and rejected by the panel author; the absence of the Brady safeguard Congress made mandatory; and, after judgment, the retaliatory interception of this Court’s own correspondence to the petitioner to prevent him from seeking this Court’s review. That last fact is documented and unrefuted. Beginning after petitioner sued the Bureau of Prisons under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in January 2026, the Bureau delayed and destroyed his legal mail, including transmittals from the Clerk of this Court dated March 17, April 8, and April 9, 2026, each verified by cryptographic (DKIM) signature, and then used the pretext that this Court’s own correspondence was “drenched in methamphetamine” to place petitioner in punitive transit through seven jails. The Bureau has never denied, on the record in *Cammarata v. Washington*, No. 2:26-cv-00007 (M.D. Ala.), ECF No. 10, that it destroyed or delayed that mail, that the mail had been sent by the Supreme Court, or that it was not opened in petitioner’s presence. The corruption thus documented runs in an unbroken line from Bureau of Prisons employees, through the district court and the Third Circuit, and now reaches the interception of this Court’s own mail, obstructing a citizen’s access to the one tribunal with the power to correct it. Whatever label attaches to each component, their cumulative effect is a proceeding whose fairness and integrity cannot be reconciled with due process. *Olano* requires that it be set aside.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,



Joseph Cammarata

Pro Se Petitioner

Register No. 02555-506

Federal Detention Center Philadelphia

P.O. Box 562

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19105

Dated: July 16, 2026

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Joseph Cammarata, hereby certify that on this 16th day of July, 2026, I caused the foregoing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to be served upon counsel for the respondent by causing a copy to be deposited in the United States mail, first-class postage prepaid, addressed to the Solicitor General of the United States, Room 5616, Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, as required by this Court's Rule 29.



Joseph Cammarata
Pro Se Petitioner
Register No. 02555-506
Dated: July 16, 2026

APPENDIX

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Const. amend. V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

U.S. Const. amend. VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

18 U.S.C. § 3231

The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.

Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof.

28 U.S.C. § 455

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; . . . (iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding

(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall have the meaning indicated: . . . (4) “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party

Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(f)

(1) In General. In all criminal proceedings, on the first scheduled court date when both prosecutor and defense counsel are present, the judge shall issue an oral and written order to prosecution and defense counsel that confirms the disclosure obligation of the prosecutor under *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny, and the possible consequences of violating such order under applicable law.

(2) Formation of Order. Each judicial council in which a district court is located shall promulgate a model order for the purpose of paragraph (1) that the court may use as it determines is appropriate.

Due Process Protections Act, Pub. L. No. 116-182, 134 Stat. 894 (2020)

An Act to amend Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require judges to remind prosecutors of their obligations under *Brady v. Maryland* in all criminal cases.

APPENDIX, EXHIBITS

The following exhibits, the financial-disclosure reports (Forms AO-10) of the trial judge for calendar years 2018, 2019, and 2020, are reproduced in support of Part IV of this petition. They were filed in the proceedings below and establish the judge's ownership, during the relevant class periods, of the securities at issue in the pending class actions discussed in Part IV.

Exhibit A, Form AO-10 Financial Disclosure Report (2018)

Exhibit B, Form AO-10 Financial Disclosure Report (2019)

Exhibit C, Form AO-10 Financial Disclosure Report (2020)